Dr Bernstein suggests that anti-vivisectionists should be able to fill in a directive requesting that they receive no medical treatment developed through work on animals. It is replied that this would only be reasonable if research not using animals had long been funded as adequately and its results were currently available. Dr Bernstein's "A modest proposal" lays down a witty challenge to opponents of animal experimentation. However, matters are rather less clear cut than he evidently realises and there are various reasons, which I list below, why an anti-vivisectionist may feel no obligation to sign such directives under present conditions. Things would be different if (1) adequately funded facilities on the National Health Service were introduced which would make no use of further medical advances based on painful animal experimentation; (2) public funding for (painful) animal research and "alternative" research henceforth reflected the proportion of those who would not, and those who would, opt for these facilities.
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(1) A first point is that Dr Bernstein does not distinguish between the use of animals in research which does, and that which does not, involve serious suffering for them (including that imposed by their housing, such as the extremes of boredom, but obviously not including being painlessly killed). The original anti-vivisection societies were, as their names imply, opposed to the cutting up of conscious live animals rather than to human use of animals in general (as may be the case with many animal right-ists nowadays) and it seems to me reasonable to use "vivisection" today in a broader sense to cover all research which involves serious animal suffering (something worse, for example, than we feel when we receive an injection (2) Even if, in practice, most of these procedures have been developed in ways which did involve serious animal suffering, it is another question whether they could have been developed without this. The anti-vivisectionist who believes that they could have been, or even probably could have been, developed (by now) by other means has no reason to avoid them because of their unfortunate and, as he thinks, (probably) unnecessary history. In fact, I suggest, no one really knows how far medicine could have advanced had work of a kind which most antivivivectionists would condemn, been avoided.' If this is so, there is no bad faith in the anti-vivisectionists making use of advances in medicine which he/she guesses would probably have been gained in other ways had the ethics of the past been more like theirs now.
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